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1. Introduction 
The 1940s - war and reconstruction - are an interlude in the financial 
history of the Netherlands. The financial consequences of the Gennan 
occupation require special attention, especially the ballooning State debt 
and money supply (section 2), as well as the way these major financial 
problems have been handled after liberation (section 3). 
When the reconstruction had been completed in the beginning of the 
1950s, the new Keynesian ideas on government spending as an instrument 
for economie policies could be put into effect. Successive governments 
aimed at stabilizing the economy by means of the budget but, partly due 
to lengthy procedures, this policy proved to intensify cyclical swings 
instead (section 4). Moreover, the building up of a welfare state and a 
weakened position in the Cabinet of the Minister of Finance undermined 
budget discipline, so that large deficits developed which led to a domina-
ting role of the government on financial markets as a borrowing party 
(section 5). Yet, the growth of semi-private or collective savings enabled 
the state to cover its deficits entirely on the Dutch market (section 6). 
2. War (1940-1945) 
As in other countries, one of the conditions of surrender to Nazi Germany 
was the acceptance of German occupation money, the so-called Reichskre-
ditkassenscheine. The Dutch monetary authorities (Ministry of Finance and 
Central Bank) feared the effects of a mixed circulation. They therefore 
agreed to provide the German troops and civil service in the Netherlands 
with Dutch money. Thus the Germans could finance their expenditure at 
least on the same footing as before the agreement.2 Their demands, thou-
gh, became stiffer and stiffer (special tributes to the war included). 
Eventually, the payments reached the total sum of ƒ 9 billion. 
Next, there were government expenses caused by the war, such as the 
organization of food distribution, evacuation costs, the compensation of 
war damage3 and even expenses for extra policemen and the 'Nederlandse 
Landwacht', a police force set up to fight against the resistance move-
ment. All in all, expenditure solely caused by the occupation amounted to 
ƒ11 billion at the end of the war in May 1945. 
Considering the fact that total State expenditure had not exceeded ƒ 1 
billion in 1939 - even if this was a year with increasing defense expenditu-
re because of growing international tension - we notice that the occupa-
tion had a ballooning effect on State budget and State debt. Increasing 
expenses forced the State to borrow about ƒ 10 billion, although State 
income covered normal expenditure (see Table 1). It issued five long-term 
loans to the tune of ƒ 3.5 billion. And it financed the remainder with 
short-term debt.4 As from Autumn 1944 the private sector did not want 
to lend to the State anymore. Henceforth the administration had to rely 
on the Central Bank. Despite all the lending to the State, the liquidity of 
the private sector had increased tremendously. The administration had 
spent all its 
Table 1 - Confrontation of income and expenditure of the Dutch 
State (in min ƒ) 
All State State expenditure Rest State State 
expenditure caused by the German income deficit 
(a) occupation (b) (a) 
1939 1051 . 1051 867 184 
1940 1748 737 1011 1005 743 
1941 3574 2323 1251 1750 1824 
1942 3827 2196 1631 1912 1915 
1943 3769 2368 1401 2022 1747. 
1944 4418 2746 1672 1884 2534 
lst half 
of 1945 1876 700 1176 478 1398 
Total 19211 11070 8141 9051 10161 
since 1940 
Source: J. Barendregt, Ch. 2. 
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borrowed money. Moreover, the possession of floating debt had given a 
huge (potential) lending power to the Dutch financial institutions. 
Full financial integration of the Dutch economy into the German 
economy occurred on the lst of April 1941, when the German authorities 
lifted the exchange controls between the two countries. The Dutch guilder 
virtually had become a German mark now, with a value of 1,327 reichs-
marks. In this sense the Netherlands were put at a disadvantage vis-a-vis 
countries such as Belgium and France where the German (military) 
authorities put up a stronger resistance against the wishes of the Reich. 
Consequently, the exchange controls between Germany and these coun-
tries had not been abolished. Now reichsmarks flooded into the Nether-
lands, because German balance of payments deficits with the Netherlands 
could not be controlled any longer by the Dutch authorities. A huge 
transfer of reichsmark assets into guilder assets also started, because 
national governments and international investors distrusted the reich-
smark. Belgium, for instance, tried to pay the Dutch with reichsmarks, but 
it refused to accept reichsmarks from them. In that way it wanted to 
minimize its reichsmark possessions and burdened the Dutch with ever 
larger amounts of this currency (Trip, 47-48). At the end of the war the 
German balance of payments debt to the Netherlands had grown to ƒ 6.7 
billion.5 This debt accumulated at the Central Bank. In total the purcha-
sing power of the Dutch private sector increased by ƒ 8.3 billion to ƒ 10.9 
billion in 1940-1945 (Lieftinck 1946, 11). Recent, adapted figures show 
less growth, but it is still an alarming growth (see Table 2). 
However, at the production side the quantity and quality of goods and 
services offered to the Dutch population declined. Many causes can be 
mentioned for this. We shall name a few. The Allies blocked Dutch sea 
harbours, so that sea trade was only possible with Northern and Eastera 
Europe. Production declined mostly due to forced migration of many 
Dutch labourers to Germany and elsewhere, and deportations of Jews and 
others. German confiscations of animals, stocks, transport material and 
other means of production and an increasing production for the Reich 
further decreased production. The growing scarcity of goods meant that 
soon after the invasion purchasing power could not find its way to the 
market completely. Thus a money overhang developed. The export surplus 
with Germany and the increasing State debt stimulated this development. 
The money overhang clearly rnanifested itself in the financial sector. 
The credit accounts of the banks, for instance, more than doubled during 
the occupation - they increased by nearly Dfl 4 billion - and mortgages 
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feil by Dfl 200 to 300 million. In addition, life insurance premiums rosé by 
Dfl 0.7 billion - they increased from Dfl 156 million (1940) to Dfl 381 
million (1944). State loans became an advantageous investment for the 
money overhang, especially since the closing of the Stock Exchange. 
Private individuals lent approximately ƒ 3 billion to the State. The Central 
Bank, private banks and Giro banks lent ƒ 4.5 billion (De Roos, Wieringa, 
217; De Jong, 240-241; CBS 1989, 145; Herstelbank, 49). 
Due to the money overhang price rises could be expected. Therefore, 
the authorities took several countermeasures. First of all they controlled 
prices. Nevertheless, a black market developed. Especially to hit the black 
marketeers, who were supposed to accumulate their wealth in the highest 
denominations, the ƒ 1000,- and ƒ 500,- bills were taken out of circulation 
in March 1943. 
As from the beginning of 1944 the increasing supply of reichsmarks and 
State debt started to become a problem for the Dutch central bank. Bank 
note reserves of the Central Bank had fallen to ƒ 180 million, whereas the 
bank note circulation itself had amounted to ƒ 3.5 billion. Thus, the 
national-socialist president Rost van Tonningen proposed to the German 
civil service in the Netherlands either to have Dutch money printed 
abroad or introducé the reichsmark as the official currency in the Nether-
lands (Barendregt, Ch. 2). Later, there were serious fuel problems for the 
printers of paper money. Distribution also became critical after a major 
strike in the transport sector (railways). The paper supply became critical 
as well. Municipalities of cities such as Rotterdam and The Hague already 
had printed their own emergency money, in case of financial straits. Rost 
van Tonningen warned the head of the German civil service, Seyss-
Inquart, that he feared a complete monetary disorganization would erupt 
early Summer 1945 (Barendregt, Ch. 2). The Central Bank probably 
would have had to decide to overprint the old bank notes with zeros in 
order to increase their value and local currencies would have been issued 
indeed, if the still occupied Northern and Western parts of the Nether-
lands had not been liberated in May 1945. 
3. Peace (1945-1950) 
One of the first measures taken by the new Minister of Finance Lieftinck 
was to defuse the highly explosive monetary situation. He drastically 
decreased the money supply in July and September/October 1945 by 
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simply blocking most of it (money purgé). The increase of national produc-
tion would determine the pace of deblocking of the blocked money. As a 
touchstone Lieftinck applied a 50%-ratio of money supply (cash and 
demand deposits) to nominal net national income at market prices 
(NNImp), which in bis view would more or less ensure monetary equiübri-
um. This equilibrium means that the amount of money in circulation 
corresponds with the value of the demand for goods and services, so that 
the money sphere does not infiuence absolute prices. The 1938 ratio had 
been 46%. Recent, adapted figures (new definitions) indicate an adapted 
ratio of about 39%. If we adapt Iieftinck's touchstone to the recent 
figures, then he aimed at a 42% ratio. With this target in mind, the Minis-
try of Finance sort of directed the allocation of deblocked money through 
a permit system. Part of the blocked money flowed to the State due to tax 
arrears. The government also raised wealth taxes (ultimately amounting to 
ƒ 3.2 billion) to finance post-war reconstruction. And a large part of the 
blocked accounts was Consolidated. The government 'froze' ƒ 2 billion 
through long-term government bonds and 5-year savings certificates and it 
'captured' ƒ 1.6 billion through long-term investment certificates. The last 
blocked money was released in June 1952. 
The money purge was a necessary step towards economie recovery, but 
it was far from a sufficiënt one. Most important of all was the restoration 
of national production and exports. This implied the buying of fuel, raw 
materials and capital goods, mostly from foreign sellers. Thus, foreign 
exchange became the most important bottleneck for recovery. The Dutch 
government therefore tried to control the allocation of foreign currency. 
By that it wanted to safeguard that the scarce foreign assets were employ-
ed in the way it thought was the best. For all that, the balance of pay-
ments situation remained critical. Foreign credit, the sale of gold and 
Dutch-owned foreign assets hardly sufficed in 1946 and 1947 to finance 
the deficits, mainly dollar shortages. The pressure increased because of 
the war expenses in Indonesia that cost ƒ 500 million of foreign currency 
out of a total balance of payments deficit of ƒ 3.7 billion in the two years 
(Van Zanden, Griffiths, p. 193). The deficits partly drained the fast 
increasing money supply, though (see Table 2). 
In 1948 Marshall Aid provided room for manoeuvre. A new industriali-
zation offensive started to increase the pace of recovery.6 Dutch competi-
tiveness improved by a 30%-devaluation of the guilder in 1949, especially 
vis-a-vis the United States.7 The German market further opened up in 
the same year. Table 2 shows the increase of national production. 
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Table 2 - Ratio of money supply (M; yearly average) to 
net national income at market prices (NNImp); 
balance of payments (B; current account) 
M (min ƒ) NNImp (min ƒ) M/NNImp B (min ƒ) 
1938 2089 5399 38.7 + 97 
April 1945 8720 3000 290,6 
Dec. 1945 3704 7490 49,5 
1946 5274 9928 53.1 -1312 
1947 7100 12066 58.8 -1667 
1948 7372 13306 55.4 -1139 
1949 7338 15181 48.3 - 222 
1950 7044 16900 41.7 -1066 
1951 6922 19279 35.9 - 90 
1952 7402 20092 36.8 +1870 
Sources: J. Barendregt, Ch. 10; 
for balance of payments: Centraal Bureau voor 
de Statis tiek (CBS) 1955 304. 
Domestically the State controlled prices, wages, dividends, house and 
ground rents, and it regulated scarcity through rationing. It also had 
control over deblockings. Nevertheless, a new money overhang developed. 
Table 2 shows that the ratio of money supply to national income exceeded 
the 1938-level for several years. This was mainly due to two reasons. First, 
money was hoarded. The limitations imposed on consumption and invest-
ment hindered the spending of income, at least until 1948/49. Then the 
increased supply of goods more than absorbed the increase of the money 
supply for the first time since the occupation (see Table 2). This absorpti-
on made possible the alleviation of rationing and the decrease of price 
subsidies.8 Furthermore, there probably was some distrust against demand 
deposits. The fact that bank secrecy had been abolished, as well as the 
fact that the tax authorities had been given much liberty to locate tax 
arrears and wealth increases accumulated during the occupation will have 
stimulated this. Money kept at home could not easily be controlled by the 
fiscal authorities. Consequently, much money in circulation did not really 
circulate within the economy. Furthermore, not all branches of industry 
had started off at the same time and at the same pace. This also neces-
sitated continued deblocking, while other branches possessed more free 
money than they were able to spend. 
Secondly and most importantly, the State had serious budget deficits, 
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especially in 1945 and 1946. On the income side, State income stagnated 
due to low national income and because of the disorganization of the tax 
collecting system. State expenses, by contrast, were high due reconstr-
uction and the war in Indonesia. To give one example, the price subsidies 
alone required as much funds as pre-war annual State income (Lieftinck 
1946, 225).9 The Dutch governments had to finance their deficits in an 
inflationary way by increasing the money supply. By that, they created a 
new money overhang. 
The disastrous financial position of the State is made very clear if we 
realize that domestic long-term lending and Marshall Aid provided the 
government with many additional resources. Minister of Finance Lieftinck 
tried to keep State expenditure low. Bilateral personal talks with his 
colleagues in the Cabinet frequently lasted through the night. Many 
ministers, exhausted as they were, had to give in. Lieftinck also wanted to 
keep the debt service as low as possible. He only reluctantly Consolidated 
short-term debt and forced a decrease of the short-term and long-term 
interest. By that he annoyed especially the institutional investors. The 
continued prolongation of short-term Treasury paper in itself was the 
main instrument of this 'cheap money' policy, though. Thus, the financial 
institutions were in large possession of short-term Treasury paper. This 
effectively precluded the application of traditional pre-war quantitative 
monetary instruments by the Central Bank, such as discount policy. 
Because Lieftinck had only reluctantly Consolidated State debt a large 
supply of quasi money was available. These so-called secondary Hquidities 
could easily be transferred into primary liquidities, i.e. cash and demand 
deposits, by simply not renewing after maturement. And indeed, this 
happened during the Korea boom in 1950. Trade liberalization in 1950 
first led to increased imports in an effort by the private sector to restore 
commercial supplies and assortments. Later in 1950, the war in Korea 
stimulated imports growth in anticipation of shortages and expected new 
rationing and import hindrances. Part of this import was speculative 
demand (Nederlandse regering 1951, III-2). Bank credit (ƒ 450 million), 
deblocking (ƒ 90 million), redemption of Treasury paper, and cash and 
deposit reserves provided the private non-financial sector with the resour-
ces. This resulted in a huge balance of payments deficit on the current 
account of ƒ 1066 million. In 1949 it had only been ƒ 222 million (see 
Table 2). Consequently, the Central Bank resumed its policy of using the 
discount rate for the first time since the war. By that it wanted to inform 
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the financial institutions about its feelings about the monetary situation. 
In this case it thought bank credit had increased too much. The new 
policy by the Central Bank sort of symbolized that the economie situation 
was about to become normal again. 
4. State budget as macro economie instrument (1950-1990) 
The economie events during the Interbellum proved that markets did 
not function as smoothly as Neo-classical economists would have wanted 
the politicians to believe. Of course, protective market restraints in the 
international economy and inflexibilities in various national markets had 
also crippled the effects of the economie tools of (Neo-)Classical econo-
mists. After the miseries of the economie crisis and the Second World 
War a strong desire had emerged in leading political circles of many 
countries to build a new society in a new way. Assisted by the bureaucra-
cies set up during the war, Western European governments began to plan, 
nationalize and invest in order to reconstruct the national economies. Pro-
grams for the redistribution of wealth and income were started. They 
allowed labourers and the elderly a fairer share in national income: social 
security improved and taxes were made more progressive. The new econo-
mie theory developed by John Maynard Keynes with its emphasis on. 
demand management fitted in perfectly with the desire for State interven-
tion. In a way Keynesianism became the post-war legitimization of State 
action, although Keynes himself did not 'prescribe' the control systems 
that were initially applied during the first years of reconstruction. In the 
Netherlands many elements of this control system were abolished in the 
fifties (see the next section). State intervention, though, continued. 
Theoretically most promising was the Keynesian policy of demand 
management to try and neutralize cyclical economie developments. The 
two main political parties in power, the KVP (catholics) and PvdA (social 
democrats), which between them held 59% to 66% of the parliamentary 
seats when they were governing (1945-1958), agreed on this issue. The 
protestant and liberal parties (27% to 30% of the seats) initially opposed 
this kind of policy, because they preferred the pre-war budget policy. 
However, there were also major differences of opinion between KVP and 
PvdA. The social-democrats wanted to use periods of cyclical upswing to 
create reserves for recession periods (Ter Heide, 272-3, 292). 
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The idea of a reserve fund was introduced in 1949 by a non-political 
committee under the chairmanship of Jan Tinbergen and vice-chairmans-
hip of Witteveen (both working at the Central Planning Bureau). The 
committee proposed to create a State-controlled tax free capital fund, 
financed with private investment money. By that it wanted to prevent 
overinvestment during periods of cyclical upswing and recession. This 
proposition had clear resemblances with the deblockmg measures of the 
money purge and probably originated from Sweden where it had some 
success.10 The social democrats in Parliament propagated a State fund 
financed with tax revenues. In 1953, a period of cyclical upswing, their 
spokesman Hofstra supported early redemption of State debt. He warned 
against pro-cyclical government proposals that reduced tax rates, especi-
ally because they had a general character. Nevertheless, the government 
in which the social democrats participated decided to do so. It gave 
priority to a general stimulus of structural development, i.e. industrial 
growth. The same happened during the next cyclical upward movement 
when new tax rate reductions stimulated recession. The following period 
of cyclical upswing gave the same clash of insight. This time the Cabinet 
and especially its Minister of Finance Hofstra wished to anticipate future 
cyclical developments. He wanted to continue depressing demand for 1959 
and 1960 through tax rates. However, the right-wing majority in Parli-
ament (KVP-members included) only authorized the government for one 
year. Hofstra and his social democrat colleagues were angry and left 
Cabinet (Ter Heide, 318-321; Zijlstra, 74). This government crisis more or 
less proved that it was virtually impossible for governments to create a 
buffer for recession periods. Another attempt was made by the Uberal 
Witteveen in 1970, then Minister of Finance. As a policy instrument 
against cyclical economie developments he introduced the so-called 
wiebéltax (swing tax). This tax implied a temporary change of tax rates to 
a maximum of 5%, combined with reductions or increases of government 
expenditure that amounted to at least 20% of the changes in tax revenues. 
The government implemented the wiebéltax in 1971 and 1972 during a 
period of cyclical upswing. Following Cabinets did not use the wiebéltax 
because of disadvantageous effects in other fields of government concern. 
The left-wing dominated Den Uyl Cabinet (1973-1977), for instance, 
stressed the global and undesired effects of the wiebéltax on income 
distribution during the period of recession it feit the economy was in 
(Koopmans, Wellink, 35, note 1). 
Demand management during periods of economie recession encounte-
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red different problems than during upswings. Especially in the 1950s 
Cabinets took serious policy measures to neutralize a temporary down-
ward movement of economie activity. However, the measures appeared to 
be ill-timed, due to lags in the three stages of policy implementation. It 
was difficult to recognize the stage the cycle was in. If, let us say, a 
downward economie movement was noticed (first stage), then counterme-
asures had to be formulated (second stage). They needed parliamentary 
approval and sometimes they only could be implemented on 1 Jamiary of 
the following year due to fiscal reasons (third stage). More often than not, 
the whole operation took more than a year and the policy effects then 
turned out to be pro-cyclical. This happened for instance in 1951-52 when 
real wage reductions, cuts in government expenditure, early tax collection 
and tax rate increases stimulated an economie recession after the Korea-
boom. Although acting vigorously, it took Hofstra ten months to formu-
late counter-cyelical measures in 1956/7 and get these through Parlia-
ment. Effects, therefore, were only visible in 1958 when the economy was 
in recession again. 
Research reports concerning the 1960s, when cyclical developments 
were more moderate, do not mention better results. Thus, we conclude 
that countercyclical government policies have been implemented too late 
during boom periods and have not been implemented at all during 
upward economie swings 
The 1970s were unstable again, although in a more structural way than 
the 1950s. During the first years of the decade world prices of basics 
increased due to a worldwide economie upswing. By that, they stimulated 
world inflation that was already there in the guise of high wage and price 
rises, fuelled by high money growth (De Nederlandsche Bank 1975, 11-12, 
19-21). Valued in American dollars, though, the price rise of industrial 
products was higher. The OPEC oil-cartel reacted with oil price increases 
that created deflationary pressure within the world economy. The OPEC-
countries were not able to spend their newly acquired capital in the short 
run. The Den Uyl Cabinet decided to increase State deficits so that the 
Netherlands would help in preventing a serious international recession. 
After a while it reduced the deficit again. It succeeded in doing this 
through an increase of State income from taxes (see Table 3), and from 
non-taxes which rosé from 2.4% of NNImp (1973) to 4.9% (1977). This 
last source of income was influenced by revenues from the production of 
natural gas. They had been linked with the oil price. The policy of the 
Den Uyl Cabinet may be classified as the last conscious effort to direct 
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economie developments with a Keynesian set of instruments, using the 
State deficit as the tooi. 
According to Keynesian theory the whole budget itself is an economie 
instrument. Growing budgets (or debts) increase national spending. K the 
State absorbs this increase completely through increases of taxes and 
social security premiums, there still remains an impulse of increased spen-
ding with multiplicator effects (Haavelmo-effect).11 This imphes that the 
high government deficits in the 1980s still had a Keynesian effect (see 
Table 3). 
However, the deficits had become so high in the beginning of the 1980s 
that it was impossible to counteract any further downward economie 
movement in a more expansive way. Since the 1960s real wages had 
increased at the expense of profits. Investments to replace labour also 
became more expensive due to increasing interest rates in the late 1970s 
Table 3 - Data about S t a t e f inanc ing (+ - s u r p l u s ) , t a x income 
and s o c i a l premiums (as % of NNImp) 
1950 1957 1965 1973 1975 1977 1983 1990 
S t a t e ba lance + l ( a ) - 4 . 4 - 5 . 1 - 1 . 4 - 5 . 0 -3 .8 - 9 . 4 -5 .2 
(cash b a s i s ) 
Tax burden 30.5 24.0 26 .1 28.4 29 .1 29.9 28 .1 31,9 
Soc. premiums 4 .7 8.7 12.2 17.4 19.3 18.7 24 .3 19 .3 
To ta l 35.2 32.7 38.3 45.8 48 .4 48.6 52.4 51.2 
Sources : A. Knoester , i n Het soc iaa l -economisch b e l e i d i n de 
tweede h e l f t van de t w i n t i g s t e eeuw, 530 /1 ; 
A. Knoester 1989, 96 /7 , 128/9 , 160 /1 ; 
F. Messing 1981, 19. 
(a) S t a t e budget d e f i c i t s (CBS 1956, 111, minus redemptions of 
long- term debt (De Nederlandsche Bank 1950, 52 ) . 
and the early 1980s. Thus, reorganizations and bankrupties in the private 
sector were ever more occurring. In itself the resulting increase of unem-
ployment and a flight into disablement allowances boosted public spen-
ding since the mid 1970s (see Table 3). Furthermore, the State consumed 
its resources (increasing the number of civil servants and increasing the 
allowances). In addition, the State started to subsidize stagnating econo-
mie sectors and enterprises, and it tried to stimulate investments with tax 
incentives. As a consequence, State investments itself decreased. Develop-
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ments in the world economy, labour union demands and an increased tax 
burden further deteriorated profits in the private sector. Consequently, 
investments decHned and economie growth almost stopped. The State, 
therefore, could not use economie growth to finance its growing needs, as 
it had done before. Due to high interest rates and a growing State debt 
the public sector experienced self-sustained growth. Interest payments bal-
looned (see Table 4). In a way Haavelmo-effects had been inverted due to 
a deterioration of profits.12 
Since the beginning of the 1980s a reduction of the government budget 
deficit is the central economie theme, irrespective of economie develop-
ments. Some successes have been scored, as we can see in Table 3. We 
will come back to this issue in the next section. 
Table 4 - Interest payments by the Dutch State (in bln ƒ (1) 
, and as % of NNImp (2) and of State expenses (3)) 
1950 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 1985 1990 
(1) 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.7 2.9 6.9 14.5 19.6 23.0 
(2) 2.9 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.5 2.3 4.2 5.2 6.3 
(3) 10.1 6.6 4.9 5.2 4.0 5.3 9.4 11.9 11.0 
Sources: W.L. Moerman, J. Vuchelen 1985, 28; 
Staten-Generaal, 15/6. 
ad (3) Sociaal-Economische Raad, 7; 
Nederlandse regering 1992 278, 293, 300; 
Centraal Planbureau 1991, 107. 
5. Causes of exploding State expenditure and income 
Before the Second World War the State had organized social security 
of the Dutchmen in a poor marmer. From way back, society had organized 
social security, in a modest way though. The State, therefore, had 
created basic provisions (poor relief, disablement benefits and pensions). 
But the allowances had been low and many people could not afford to 
pay the premiums. After the Second World War, all kinds of insurance 
provisions (accident, medical, disability and pension insurances), health 
care, education and housing became priorities. The State often offered 
them at prices below cost or even for free (merit goods). Social security 
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benefits rosé sharply from 10% of national income in 1950 to 33% in 
1985. The share of education, housing and health care increased from 
12% to 32% (Van Zanden, Griffiths, 70). Table 3 indicates in what way 
this growth of the public sector (State and social security) was financed: 
mostly by increasing the share of social premiums. Taxes only moderately 
increased if expressed in % NNImp, which was mainly due to growing 
non-tax income (gas production) and increasing deficits. Also, if we look 
at the tax and social premium burden expressed in daily wages (et al), 
then we notice a regular growth, due to social premiums - the tax burden 
even decreased (see Table 5). Obviously, the total sum of wages (et al) 
has risen faster than national income. Prime cost increasing taxes expres-
sed in daily wages also showed a tendency to fall, except in the 1980s, but 
they had a remarkably constant share in total tax income (± 42% in 1946-
1990; average per 10 years). All in all, State expenses could not sufficient-
ly be covered from income, especially since the 1970s. Net State debt 
ultimately had grown to 67% of national income in 1990 (NNImpl990 = 
ƒ 454 billion).13 
Table 5 - Tax and social premium burden expressed in daily 
wages (number of days) 
Tax on wages, social total prime cost total 
salaries and premiums increasing 
soc. benefits (a^  (a) taxes 
1951 75 9 84 108 192 
1960 66 32 98 72 170 
1970 66 47 113 67 180 
1980 65 50 115 60 175 
1988 57 66 123 69 192 
Calculations from CBS, Nationale Rekeningen, 1960, 84 88, 
1972, 109, 1975, 113, 116, 1990, 56, 58 , 128, 150 and 151. 
(a) Paid by employees and persons on we' .fare only. 
A second important cause of State budget growth was the way the 
Ministers of Finance were able to control public expenditure. Changes in 
the mechanism of this control to a large extent made government expen-
diture. Changes in the mechanism of this control to a large extent made 
government expenditure uncontrollable. Economie problems in the 1980s 
aggravated this. 
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During the reconstruction period Minister Lieftinck (1945-1952) kept a 
close watch on every cent that the Cabinet spent. He carefully screened 
ministerial budgets. In fact, one could say that Lieftinck's bilateral discus-
sions with the other ministers determined the budget. He had the backing 
of his Prime Ministers, who turned a deaf ear on complaints by the 
spending ministers. The Council of Ministers only seldom discussed indi-
vidual budget items. In 1952 State expenditure had been reduced from 
more than 47% of National income in 1946 to well under 30% (Neder-
landse regering 1958, 20). Since the beginning of the 1960s the share of 
the State sector only rosé. 
In the 1950s bilateral preparation lost importance more and more. The 
Council of Ministers took more decisions then. This created the possibility 
of mutual support between ministers that undermined the position of the 
Minister of Finance. Minister A now could successfully claim resources 
and minister B would not protest if A would not protest against claims 
from B.14 The same mechanism functioned within political parties: parli-
amentary specialists could mutually act in the same way as ministers did 
in the Council of Ministers. This was, by the way, a climate pressure 
groups could flourish in, so that budget claims increased further. 
The introduction in 1961 of the so-called structurcd budget pottcy was 
another measure that undermined the position of the Minister of Finan-
ce.15 Minister of Finance Zijlstra wanted to create a touchstone for 
(future) government expenditure instead of the ever changing budget 
policies due to cyclical economie movements. He wished to fit the pattern 
of government expenses into a medium term growth path of the national 
economy.16 In the longer run the budget balance (i.e., deficits) should be 
reconciled with the structural relation of saving and investment in the 
private sector of which the current account of the balance of payments is 
one expression. Then demand would keep pace with production capaci-
ty.17 If necessary, counter cyclical measures could be carried out, such as 
the delay of planned tax rate reductions in 1961 that could be put into 
practice any moment (Zijlstra, 124). There was also a built-in countercy-
clical component, because decreases of tax income or even budget deficits 
due to recession did not matter as long as the State based its spending on 
the medium term growth path. For the same reason increases of tax 
income and budget surpluses during periods of economie upswing did not 
matter either. The Zijlstra-touchstone for budget deficits gave more 
freedom to his colleagues in the Cabinet, because he let them decide how 
to divide the money available within the expenditure norm. Economie 
14 
growth now by definition implied that there was more govemment money 
to spend. Because national income increased tremendously, govemment 
expenditure did so too. In addition, the climate of growth of course did 
not stimulate the evaluation of the necessity of expenditure, nor did it 
lead to a decreasing burden for the taxpayer. 
One other important change in the budget technique was the introduc-
tion in 1966/7 of long-term estimates of budget items which made possi-
ble the discovery of so-called camel noses.18 However, again this created 
the possibility for ministers to claim 'their share', as determined in the 
past by the long-range estimates. 
The decreasing growth of national income in the 1970s therefore 
created difficulties. Thus, Ministers of Finance took countermeasures to 
limit the growth of govemment expenditure. They wanted ministries to 
compensate overspending within their own budget and ended the use of 
the structural budget policy. They also stressed the importance of bilateral 
negotiations. Other means were periodical evaluations of budget spending 
and govemment programs that formulated targets to reduce the budget 
deficits. Nevertheless, ministers found many ways to undermine or even 
evade cuts in their departmental budget. By that they defended their 
position vis-a-vis their civil service and pressure groups. They used for 
instance windfalls to limit reductions needed in their budgets. Setbacks, 
on the other hand, they seldom compensated. And there were many more 
methods to avoid budget cuts (Toirkens, 21-23). During the 1980s State 
income suddenly increased more than expected due to a cyclical upswing 
since 1983. Slowly the govemment deficit was reduced. One could argue, 
though, that deficits still had not been reduced in a structural, non-cyclical 
way (Sterks et al, 619). 
The 1970s and 1980s also led to a crisis in the belief that the State 
could freely manipulate the economy, correcting the flaws of the private 
sector. Keynesianism could not give a satisfying answer to the economie 
problems that arose. There was economie stagnation combined with 
inflation (stagflation) and the public sector could not be expanded any 
further to neutralize this. In the Netherlands the high burden for the 
taxpayer (taxes and social premiums) combined with the catching up with 
international wages in the 1960s had made labour expensive vis-a-vis 
capital in the 1970s. The large public sector had undermined competitive-
ness of the Dutch economy. This resulted in a high number of redundan-
ties and a ballooning number of persons on unemployment and disability 
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benefits. In such a climate economie theorists who believed in the ineffec-
tiveness of State intervention became influential (Monetarists and Neo-
classicists), as well as theorists who stressed the importance of supply 
instead of demand (Supply-siders). The classic adage of a State that only 
assists the private sector in the way that this sector can operate freely 
(apart from corrections of major fiaws) returned. In the Netherlands the 
government gave up all kinds of intervention, such as wage and price 
policy. It tried to simplify the fiscal system and reduced individual social 
allowances. The governments played competitiveness on foreign markets 
as the tramp card for economie recovery. Low wage demands by trade 
unions, caused by the economie recession in the beginning of the 1980s, 
and low inflation rates indeed had their positive effects when the interna-
tional economie situation improved. Due to high profits the private sector 
was mostly back on its feet again. By way of support the State tried to 
decrease the burden on the taxpayer, but it was not really successful in 
doing this, as the data in Table 3 indicate. The reduction of government 
budget deficits was the primary concern. 
6. Capital market 
The Dutch state generally financed lts budget deficits on the Dutch 
capital market. This market supplied sufficients amounts of money, due to 
the growth of savings, especially the semi-private or collective savings 
(pension, social insurance and private insurance funds; see Table 6).19 
Table 6 - Private and semi-private savings (stocks) 
investment by 
pension and private 
insurance funds 
savings at 
banks 
investment by 
investment funds 
total 
ƒ %NNImp ƒ ENNImp ƒ %NNImp %NNImp 
1951 8 40 
1986 • 240 120 
4 20 
150 40 
0 0 
37 10 
60 
170 
Source: CBS 1899-1989, 145, 149. 
Consequently, the State has only rarely raised loans expressed in foreign 
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currency.20 Particularly the role of the pension funds is important in this 
respect. Their investments have grown from 18% of NNLnp in 1951 to 
83% in 1986, and they invested large amounts of capital in State debt, 
partly compelled by regulations imposed by the State (the large State 
pension fund ABP) and partly voluntarily. The other institutional investors 
(i.e., savings banks) also invested in low-risk long-term assets expressed in 
Dutch currency, primarily State debt and loans to local administrations, 
partly due to regulations made by the Central Bank (see below). Foreign 
investors and other private investors tended to take more risks and invest 
in shares relatively more (P.A. van de Paverd, 46). Besides, the strong 
guilder was an extra reason for foreign investors to buy Dutch securities, 
because it increased their profit margin if expressed in currencies that 
tend to depreciate vis-a-vis the Dutch guilder. A change in the loan 
conditions has also encouraged long-term lending to the State by private 
investors and banks (see Table 7). First of all, the interest rates increased 
because of growing inflation, increasing uncertainty and tight money 
policies by central banks. Furthermore, growing State debt enabled 
investors to negotiate more favourable conditions, which resulted in 
shorter redemption periods, so that they could respond better to changing 
circumstances (De Kam et al., 64). Table 7 shows the ownership of 
government bonds in 1938-1987. 
Table 7 - Owners of Consolidated State debt (in % ) , and the 
debt itself (in bln ƒ) 
1938 1952 1960 1970 1980 1987 
Institutional 
investors (a) 44 63 30 52 63 50 
Banks (b) —i 22 15 11 20 
Foreign invest. 56 (c) 37(c) 11 12 
Private invest. 48(c) 33(c) 14(c) 18(c) 
Consolidated 
State debt 3.2 8.4 12.5 23.5 78.1 234.5 
Sources: Herstelbank, 245, 260 (for 1938 and 1952); 
F. de Kam et al, 64 (for 1960 -1987); 
CBS 1899-1989 , 168 (for conso" Lidated ! State debt) 
(a) for 1938 and 1952: including savings banks i 
(b) for 1960-1987: inc luding savings banks; 
(c) remainder. 
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Because of their money-creating effects monetary authorities (State and 
Central Bank) have been critical of short-term loans most of time in the 
period under consideration. Nonetheless, in the 1940s - when long-term 
State borrowing had been stopped - in 1968-1971, and in 1976-1983 short-
term financing of State deficits increased, until an agreement between 
Central Bank and the government put an end to most inflationary State 
borrowing. Since 1982, the overall effect of the fiscal policy on the 
(broad) money supply (i.e., primary and secondary liquidity) has been 
deflationary, however, there still were some inflationary effects in 1986, 
1987 and 1989 (De Nederlandsche Bank, appendices). 
Notes 
1. The author acknowledges Professor Hans Visser for his comments. 
2. The Dutch central bank requested the banks and other financial institutions to hand in the Kas-
senscheine in exchange for Dutch guilders or deposits (see L.J.A. Trip, 5-10). 
3. Most war damage compensations had been registered in the so-called Grootboek voor de 
Wederopbouw. They had not been paid out, because building activities during the war had been 
slender, at least those in the civilian sector. 
4. The State also amortized ƒ 1 billion during the war. 
5. In Berlin ƒ 2 billion was subtracted as payment for war tributes. 
6. New industrial activity had to absorb the fast growing Dutch population. The mostly indicative 
stimulance of industrialization was aimed at changing the dominant position of basics and food in 
exports 
7. A first devaluation had been implemented in 1944. 
8. In 1952 the rationing was ended when the free sale of coffee was allowed again. In 1954 the last 
producers ration (fuel) was cancelled. 
9. In order to combat inflation Dutch governments tried to control prices. As one of the instru-
ments they applied price subsidies to compensate for the difference between import prices and 
domestic prices. 
10. The investment money had to be blocked on accounts at the Central Bank on a voluntary basis. 
It would only be released after approval by the government conceming the right time and the 
minimum amount (in order to guarantee the desired cyclical effects). To prevent tax evasion only 
withdrawals from the fund for additional investment - i.e. investment not financed in the usual way 
by write offs - had to be allowed (see W.B. Reynen). In Sweden an investment funds system had 
been introduced in 1938. It played a role of importance as from 1955 (see A. Lindbeck, 97-102). 
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11. With the assumption of a marginal consumption quote of net available income that is below 1 
(see H. Visser 1980,226). 
12. See also A. Knoester 1991. 
13. If we include the other public authorities, then we come to 83%. 
14. In periods of budget cuts this non-intervention mechanism probably does not work, because 
every minister wants the others to decrease their budget so that his or her budget cuts need not be 
so high (see SJ. Toirkens, 27-31). 
15. Structural implied 'followingthe medium-term growth rate of national income'. 
16. This was meant as an analogy with the monetary policy of the Central Bank under president 
Holtrop that tried to match the growth of the supply of primary and secundary liquidity with the 
growüi path of real national income. Statement from Zijlstra in Het sociaal-economisch beleid in de 
tweede helft van de twintigste eeuw, 388/9. 
17. See H. Burger, 330. The basic period had to be one of full use of productive capacity, full 
employment, and the economie data had to be without cyclical and incidental influences. 
18. Camel noses are plans that cost little money in the beginning but much money in the future. 
19. Briefly some comments on the matter of 'crowding out' of private demand on the capita! 
market due to State demand. The share of State demand vis-a-vis supply has gradually decreased 
over the period under consideration. In the 1950s (1952-1959) it was 55% (1952: 82%, 1958:48%), 
in the 1960s the percentage was 38%, and in the 1970s it had fallen to 27%. In the 1980s (1980-
1990) the State's share has increased again to 52% (1980: 37%, 1982-1984:68%, 1990: back to 
40%). Due to tight money policies carried out abroad, the interest rate the government had to 
allow rosé whereas its share on the capital market was relatively low (1979: 24%, 1980: 37%). 
Then, interest rates feil whereas State borrowing ballooned (1982-1984:68%). Moreover, there was 
also a net export of capital. Thus, at the moment we should expect 'crowding out' there was a net 
capital export! Obviously, the liberation of international capital movements has changed the 
scenery. Therefore, it has become more difficult to assess whether there has been 'crowding out' in 
the 1980s or not, i.e.,whether borrowing by the State has increased interest rates. The sources for 
the data were Visser (1978 and 1983) and De Nederlandsche Bank, Jaarverslagen Jiijlagen 7 and 11. 
20. During the first post-war years the government borrowed foreign currency to finance recon-
struction through imports. The redemption of foreign debt was completed in 1976. 
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